

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 125109

53

ORIGIN AGR-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 STR-04 H-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 EB-07

FRB-03 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 LAB-04 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

AID-05 CIEP-01 SS-15 ITC-01 TRSE-00 PRS-01 SP-02

FEAE-00 OMB-01 OIC-02 AF-08 ARA-06 EA-07 NEA-10 /135 R

DRAFTED BY USDA:RSIMPSON:JT 5/20/76

APPROVED BY STR:CYEUTTER

OFF/FPD:PTAYLOR

COMMERCE:DSCHLEC;TY

OFF/FPD:FSPELLMAN

STR:JSTARKEY

EB/OTTA:TOHERRON

AGRICULTURE:ROELL

TREASURY:MFELDMAN

----- 002980

O 211336Z MAY 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL MTN GENEVA IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 125109

H PASS CODEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGSETRD;GATT;EAGR

SUBJECT: MAY 24 GRAINS SUBGROUP MEETING -- STATEMENT U.S.

DELEGATE

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT OF US DEL ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION.TEXT:

1. AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SUBGROUP -- ALMOST EXACTLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 125109

A YEAR AGO--MY DELEGATION STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE  
UNITED STATES PLACES ON ACHIEVING TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN  
GRAINS IN THIS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE POINTED OUT  
THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF GRAINS IN THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

OF THE U.S. AND THE PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE U.S. AS A  
SUPPLIER OF GRAINS TO THE WORLD. DURING 1972-74 CROP  
YEARS, THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIED ALL OF THE 76 MILLION  
TON (NET) TOTAL INCREASE IN WORLD GRAIN EXPORTS (EXCLUDING  
RICE), PLUS AN ADDITIONAL 14 MILLION TONS TO COMPENSATE  
FOR REDUCED EXPORTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. (ALL  
COMPARISONS IN RELATION TO 1971).  
THE DRAMATIC U.S. SUPPLY RESPONSE WAS TRIGGERED BY  
MARKET FORCES OPERATING IN A MARKET-ORIENTED FARM ECONOMY.  
THE IMPLICATION IS CLEAR. AN INTERNATIONAL TRADING STRUCTURE  
BASED ON LIBERALIZED NATIONAL TRADE POLICIES IS BY FAR THE  
MOST RELIABLE AND EFFICIENT BASIS FOR ENSURING THE AVAILA-  
BILITY OF ADEQUATE GRAIN SUPPLIES TO MEET WORLD NEEDS.  
LET US EXAMINE THE THREE MAJOR U.S. MARKET RESPONSES IN  
TERMS OF THEIR RELEVANCE TO OUR EFFORTS IN THE MTN TO FIND  
A GRAINS SOLUTION.  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

## 2. STOCKS

THE 1972 CROP YEAR WAS AFFECTED BY A MAJOR SOVIET  
SHORTFALL IN GRAIN PRODUCTION. U.S. GRAIN EXPORTS  
DOUBLED IN THAT YEAR, THE 16 MILLION TON INCREASE COMING  
ENTIRELY FROM A DRAWDOWN OF STOCKS. AS WORLD DEMAND  
REMAINED STRONG RELATIVE TO SUPPLIES DURING THE FOLLOWING  
TWO YEARS, U.S. STOCKS WERE FURTHER DRAWN DOWN SO THAT  
OVER THE THREE YEAR PERIOD A TOTAL OF 45 MILLION TONS OF  
GRAINS WERE RELEASED FROM U.S. STOCKS. SIGNIFICANTLY,  
WORLD STOCKS DURING THIS TIME DECREASED BY ONLY 48  
MILLION TONS.

WHY DID THE U.S. BEAR 90% OF THE BURDEN OF THE WORLD  
STOCK ADJUSTMENT? FIRST, BECAUSE OTHER KEY GRAIN CONSUM-  
ING COUNTRIES HAD NEVER ESTABLISHED A LEVEL OF RESERVES  
PROPORTIONATE TO THAT CARRIED BY THE U.S. THEY PRE-  
FERRED INSTEAD TO MAINTAIN LOWER STOCK LEVELS, INSULATED  
FROM WORLD MARKET FORCES. THIS WAS, NO DOUBT, PARTLY  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 125109

RELATED TO THE HIGH COST OF CARRYING SUBSTANTIAL  
SURPLUS RESERVES. MOREOVER, SO LONG AS THE U.S. AND TWO  
OR THREE OTHER EXPORTING COUNTRIES CARRIED RESERVES,  
OTHER COUNTRIES DID NOT PERCEIVE A NEED TO DO SO.

WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM RECENT EVENTS?  
CLEARLY, A MAJOR CONCLUSION IS THAT EVEN THE RELATIVELY  
HIGH LEVEL OF WORLD STOCKS HELD AT THE BEGINNING OF 1972  
(APPROXIMATELY 150 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT AND FEEDGRAINS)

WAS INADEQUATE TO STABILIZE WORLD PRICES IN THE FACE  
OF A SUCCESSION OF PRODUCTION SHORTFALLS IN KEY AREAS

AND INCREASED DEMAND. IF COUNTRIES STILL BELIEVE THAT THEIR 1972 STOCK LEVELS WERE ADEQUATE--AND THE U.S. CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT IT WAS HOLDING AN EXCESSIVELY LARGE SHARE AT THAT TIME--THE COSTS OF ESTABLISHING EVEN LARGER STOCKS CAPABLE OF STABILIZING PRICES OVER A COMPARABLE TIME PERIOD, WOULD SURELY BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE U.S. DOES NOT INTEND TO HOLD SUCH A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF WORLD STOCKS IN FUTURE PERIODS OF SUBSTANTIAL SURPLUS.

### 3. PRODUCTION

IN RESPONSE TO SHARPLY INCREASED EXPORT DEMAND, THE U.S. BROUGHT BACK INTO PRODUCTION APPROXIMATELY 40 MILLION ACRES PREVIOUSLY SET ASIDE BECAUSE OF LACK OF ADEQUATE MARKET OPPORTUNITIES. UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, THIS RESPONSE WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE

IN ANNUAL AVAILABILITIES. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF FACTORS LIMITED THIS. FIRST, SOME LAND WHICH HAD NOT BEEN CONTINUOUSLY CULTIVATED COULD NOT BE BROUGHT BACK INTO FULL PRODUCTION IMMEDIATELY. MOREOVER, CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OVER ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS, MANY OF WHICH REMAINED INSULATED FROM WORLD MARKET FORCES, CAUSED U.S. FARMERS TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN INCREASING PRODUCTION. ADVERSE WEATHER AND REDUCED RATES OF APPLICATION OF FERTILIZER AS A RESULT OF THE GENERAL ENERGY CRISIS WERE IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING OUTPUT DURING PART OF THIS PERIOD. FINALLY, SOME OF THE RESTORED ACREAGE WENT INTO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 STATE 125109

SOYBEAN PRODUCTION WHICH SUPPLEMENTED ANIMAL FEED SUPPLIES AND THUS REDUCED PRESSURES ON FEED GRAINS MARKETS.

WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THIS? MOST IMPORTANTLY, WHILE GRAIN PRODUCTION IS RESPONSIVE WHEN MARKET FORCES OPERATE, PRODUCTION ALONE CANNOT BE RELIED ON AS A SURE SOURCE OF MAJOR SHORT TERM ADJUSTMENT. IN THE LONG TERM, OF COURSE, IMPROVED PRODUCTION IS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE MAJOR FOOD CHALLENGE REPRESENTED BY PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH.

### 4. CONSUMPTION

IN 1974 EXTREMELY ADVERSE WEATHER REDUCED THE U.S. GRAIN CROP BY APPROXIMATELY 35 MILLION TONS FROM THE PRECEDING YEAR. WORLD PRICES SOARED AT THE PROSPECT OF THIS STAGGERING DECLINE AND KEY COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTED VARIABLE AND OTHER TYPES OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT DOMESTIC SUPPLIES AND MAINTAIN NORMAL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS.. THE U.S. OPPOSED THIS APPROACH AND

MADE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP ITS MARKET OPEN WITH THE RESULT THAT THE IMPACT OF WORLD NEEDS AND PRICES WAS FELT FULLY ON THE U.S. MARKETS, PARTICULARLY THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR. DOMESTIC U.S. LIVESTOCK FEEDING DECLINED BY 37 MILLION TONS IN THE 1974 CROP YEAR ALONE. THE SUPPLIES THUS RELEASED, ALONG WITH A FURTHER 4 MILLION TON DRAWDOWN OF U.S. STOCKS, PERMITTED THE U.S. TO EXPORT 62 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN - THE THIRD HIGHEST LEVEL OF U.S. EXPORTS IN THE PAST THIRTY YEARS.

THE ADJUSTMENT OF U.S. LIVESTOCK FEEDING WAS NOT, OF COURSE, WITHOUT REPERCUSSIONS ON U.S. PRICES FOR LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS AND ON LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS' INCOMES. THIS ADJUSTMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE, AND WOULD HAVE HAD A MUCH SMALLER IMPACT ON U.S. AND WORLD GRAIN PRICES, IF IT HAD BEEN SHARED BY OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH LARGE ANIMAL FEEDING SECTORS.

THE NEXT TIME MAJOR PRODUCTION SHORTFALLS AFFECT WORLD SUPPLIES OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD, AND NO DOUBT THERE WILL BE A NEXT TIME, ADJUSTMENT MAY BE MUCH MORE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 STATE 125109

DIFFICULT THAN DURING RECENT YEARS. THERE MAY NOT BE A RESERVOIR OF RETIRED CROPLAND STANDING READY FOR SHORT-TERM USE. THERE MAY NOT BE SUCH LARGE RESERVE STOCKS AS EXISTED IN MID-1972. AND IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT THOSE FEW COUNTRIES WHO THIS TIME PERMITTED THEIR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION LEVELS TO CHANGE WITH WORLD SUPPLY CONDITIONS MAY, NEXT TIME, NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO TO THE SAME EXTENT. UNDER ANY OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IMPACT ON WORLD PRICES AND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF GRAIN FOR DIRECT HUMAN FOOD WOULD BE MUCH MORE ACUTE. IT IS THUS, IN THE U.S. VIEW, ESSENTIAL THAT THE WORLD'S CAPACITY FOR ADJUSTMENT OF GRAIN CONSUMPTION BE INCREASED, AND SHARED MORE EQUITABLY. THE CONSEQUENT REDUCTION OF EXTREME PRICE INSTABILITY, AND IMPROVEMENT IN THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD DURING PERIODS OF SHORTAGE, WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR BENEFIT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT OBSERVATION SHOULD BE MADE ABOUT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FEW YEARS. IT IS THE FIRM VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT ITS RESPONSE TO WORLD GRAIN REQUIREMENTS WOULD NOT--INDEED, COULD NOT--HAVE OCCURRED IF AN INTERNATIONAL GRAINS AGREEMENT HAD OBLIGATED THE U.S. TO ADHERE TO A RIGID, PREDETERMINED RANGE OF EXPORT PRICES DURING THIS PERIOD. BASED ON EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO 1974, AN INTERNATIONAL PRICE "BAND" OPERATING DURING 1974 WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE HAD A MAXIMUM PRICE SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW \$6 PER BUSHEL FOR WHEAT AND \$4 PER BUSHEL FOR CORN. YET HAD THE U.S. BEEN PLEDGED

TO RESTRICT PRICES BELOW THOSE LEVELS, THE KEY 1974  
ADJUSTMENT OF U.S. ANIMAL FEEDING WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN  
PLACE, AND U.S. GRAIN EXPORTS WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED  
CORRESPONDINGLY IN THAT CRUCIAL YEAR. UNDER SUCH A  
COMMODITY AGREEMENT WOULD OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE RELEASED  
SUPPLIES TO MAKE UP THE DIFFERENCE AT THAT TIME? IN  
LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE, THIS SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. UNDER  
ONE MAJOR PROPOSAL MADE IN THIS SUBGROUP, ONLY EXPORTING  
COUNTRIES WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO SUPPLY SPECIFIC QUANTITIES  
AT MAXIMUM PRICES, AND THESE QUANTITIES WOULD BE IN LINE  
WITH HISTORICAL EXPORTS. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT MAJOR  
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH LARGE ANIMAL FEEDING SECTORS  
WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATION TO MAKE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 06 STATE 125109

AVAILABLE SUPPLIES SO LONG AS THEY WERE SELF-SUFFICIENT  
IN GRAINS OR WERE SLIGHT NET IMPORTERS. CLEARLY, IN A  
SEVERE SHORTAGE SITUATION, ALL COUNTRIES WITH ADEQUATE

SUPPLIES SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE A PORTION OF THEM AVAILABLE  
FOR EXPORT--AS THE U.S. DID DURING RECENT YEARS--IF A  
CRISIS IS TO BE AVOIDED. THE ARTIFICIAL CONTAINMENT OF  
WORLD MARKET FORCES AND PRICES UNDER A COMMODITY AGREE-  
MENT FOR GRAINS WOULD, IN THE U.S. VIEW, NOT PERMIT THIS  
TO HAPPEN. THE RESULT WOULD BE CONTINUED INSTABILITY,  
AND RISK OF SEVERE GRAIN SHORTAGES. SIMILARLY, DURING  
TIMES OF SURPLUS SUPPLIES, SUCH A COMMODITY AGREEMENT  
WOULD MINIMIZE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION ADJUSTMENTS  
AND THUS AMPLIFY DOWNWARD PRESSURES ON WORLD PRICES. THIS  
WOULD IN TURN LEAD TO EVENTUAL PRODUCTION CUTBACKS IN  
EXPORTING COUNTRIES, SETTING THE STAGE FOR ANOTHER PERIOD  
OF WORLD SHORTAGES.

WE NOW HAVE A FULL YEAR'S EXPERIENCE BEHIND US IN  
THIS SUBGROUP. WE ARE ALL AWARE THAT SOME IMPORTANT  
WORK HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. WE HAVE BUILT AN IMPRESSIVE BASE  
OF DOCUMENTATION ON GRAIN TRADE AND NATIONAL POLICIES.  
WE HAVE EXAMINED INTENSIVELY COUNTRIES' POLICIES AND HAVE  
AIRED THOROUGHLY THE VIEWS OF DELEGATIONS ON THE BILATERAL  
AND MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE POLICIES. PERHAPS  
MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, COUNTRIES HAVE STATED THEIR MAJOR  
GOALS FOR GRAIN NEGOTIATIONS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS HAVE  
BEEN MADE AS TO HOW NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED.

ALL OF THIS WAS NECESSARY GROUNDWORK FOR THE ULTIMATE  
TASK THAT IS NOW BEFORE ;S. WE MUST NOW MOVE FORWARD  
IN THIS SUBGROUP AND IN OTHER RELEVANT GROUPS OF THE MTN  
TO EXPAND AND LIBERALIZE WORLD TRADE IN GRAINS. WE MUST  
COMMIT OURSELVES TO CREATING A MORE RESPONSIVE STRUCTURE  
FOR WORLD GRAIN TRADE -- ONE THAT IS MORE IN KEEPING  
WITH THE MUCH LARGER ROLE OF ANIMAL FEEDING IN THE  
TOTAL GRAIN ECONOMY AND ONE THAT RECOGNIZES THE VASTLY

IMPROVED SYSTEMS OF MARKET INFORMATION. WE MUST BEGIN  
THE PROGRESSIVE DISMANTLING OF OBSTACLES TO TRADE AS  
PLEDGED IN THE TOKYO DECLARATION. SURPLUS AND DEFICIT  
COUNTRIES ALIKE--PARTICULARLY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES--  
MUST RECOGNIZE A NEW OBLIGATION TO PARTICIPATE TO A  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 07 STATE 125109

REASONABLE EXTENT IN WORLD ADJUSTMENT TO SEVERE GRAIN  
SURPLUSES AND SHORTFALLS. WE CAN GREATLY REDUCE MARKET  
INSTABILITY IF MORE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE IN RESPONDING  
TO GLOBAL MARKET FORCES. IN SO DOING WE WILL ENORMOUSLY  
EASE THE IMPACT OF TIGHT SUPPLY SITUATIONS ON DEVELOPING  
IMPORTING COUNTRIES.

THESE ARE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF HIGHEST PRIORITY  
TO THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE REALISTIC ABOUT THEM. WE  
RECOGNIZE THAT IF IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARD LIBERALIZATION  
ARE ACHIEVED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY MAY NEED TO BE  
PHASED IN OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. BUT THE FOOD CHALLENGES  
OF THE PRESENT INDICATE THAT THE TIME TO BEGIN IS NOW.

WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SHORT SUPPLY SITUATIONS OR  
SURPLUS SITUATIONS WILL BE MORE FREQUENT IN FUTURE  
YEARS. WE NO LONGER BELIEVE THAT THE CASE FOR TRADE  
LIBERALIZATION RESTS SIMPLY ON THE PRESUMPTION OF LONG-  
TERM SURPLUSES. WHAT IS NEEDED, IN OUR VIEW, IS A SYSTEM  
WHICH FACILITATES TRANSITION BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN  
TIGHT SUPPLY AND OVER SUPPLY SITUATIONS.

5. THE MAJOR ELEMENTS FOR GRAINS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE  
MTN ARE CLEAR TO THE UNITED STATES. I WILL STATE THEM  
SUCCINCTLY.

--TRADE LIBERALIZATION MUST BE OUR OVERRIDING GOAL. WE  
MUST BEGIN TO CREATE A MORE FLEXIBLE SYSTEM IN WHICH  
TRADE GROWS, RESOURCES ARE USED EFFICIENTLY AND SUPPLIES  
ARE ALLOCATED ACCORDING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE WORLD  
MARKET -- NOT SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF EXCESSIVELY-PROTECTED  
NATIONAL MARKETS. IF IT CONTINUES TO BE LEFT TO ONE OR  
TWO COUNTRIES TO MAKE THE BULK OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS, THERE  
IS RISK THAT THEY BE FORCED TO TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT  
THEMSELVES DURING TIMES OF EXCESSIVE EXTERNAL PRESSURES.

-- BORDER MEASURES SHOULD BE THE IMMEDIATE FOCUS OF  
OUR CONCERNS. IN JUNE WE STRESSED THAT THE UNITED  
STATES PROCEEDS FROM THE FULLEST RESPECT FOR THE INTERNAL  
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF ALL COUNTRIES. WHAT IS ESSENTIAL  
IS THAT COUNTRIES PROVIDE FOR A LARGE DEGREE OF FREEDOM  
FOR THE INTERPLAY OF WORLD MARKET FORCES AS REGARDS  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 08 STATE 125109

INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

-- AVOIDANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD CREATE NEW RIGIDITIES IN PRODUCTION AND TRADE AND WHICH WOULD PREVENT ADJUSTMENT OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY TO MARKET REQUIREMENTS IS AN ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE U.S.

-- MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS CONCERNING TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS DEVELOPED IN THE MTN MUST BE APPLICABLE TO GRAINS.

-- PRIORITY ATTENTION MUST BE ACCORDED TO THE CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AT ALL STAGES IN WORK OF THE SUBGROUP IN FURTHERANCE OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE TOKYO DECLARATION.

-- BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL CONTACTS WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN RESOLVING DIFFERENCES AND SEEKING COMPROMISE APPROACHES TO THE WIDE RANGE OF OBJECTIVES THAT COUNTRIES HAVE WITH RESPECT TO GRAINS. IT WOULD BE CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR COUNTRIES TO DISCUSS CONFIDENTIAL,

CONDITIONAL AND HIGHLY SENSITIVE VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING APPROACHES IN FUTURE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE SUBGROUP. MOREOVER, BARRIERS TO TRADE ARE DIVERSE AND DIFFERENT IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY SO THAT MANY SPECIFIC PROBLEMS MUST BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY.

IT WAS IN RECOGNITION OF THIS LAST POINT THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSED AT THE OCTOBER MEETING OF THE SUBGROUP THAT A NOTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURE BE ADOPTED BY THE SUBGROUP SO THAT NECESSARY BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL CONTACTS MAY BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND CONTINUE OVER A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW RESULTS OF THE CRUCIAL FINAL STAGE OF THE MTN NEXT YEAR (MTN/GR/W/4 ADD 1). WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD BE PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH SPECIFIC, CONCRETE OBJECTIVES OF ALL COUNTRIES COULD BE PURSUED--WHETHER THEY RELATED PRIMARILY TO LIBERALIZATION, STABILIZATION OR THE CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IT DID NOT SEEK TO COMMIT ALL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 09 STATE 125109

COUNTRIES TO A SINGLE NEGOTIATING HYPOTHESIS AS DID THE PROPOSALS OF SOME OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL REMAINS ON THE TABLE AND WE WOULD WELCOME THE VIEWS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS. END TEXT.  
ROBINSON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 15 SEP 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TEXT, MEETINGS, GRAINS, AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 MAY 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** morefirh  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE125109  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** USDA:RSIMPSON:JT 5/20/76  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D760197-0636  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t197605109/baaaepbn.tel  
**Line Count:** 381  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN AGR  
**Original Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 7  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** morefirh  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <02 APR 2004 by morefirh>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MAY 24 GRAINS SUBGROUP MEETING -- STATEMENT U.S.  
**TAGS:** ETRD, EAGR, US, SZ, GATT  
**To:** MTN GENEVA INFO EC BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006